Texas A&M University School of Law

Texas A&M Law Scholarship
Faculty Scholarship
4-2008

ERISA, Agency Costs, and the Future of Health Care in the United
States
John Bronsteen
Brendan S. Maher
brendan.maher@law.tamu.edu

Peter K. Stris

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/facscholar
Part of the Health Law and Policy Commons

Recommended Citation
John Bronsteen, Brendan S. Maher & Peter K. Stris, ERISA, Agency Costs, and the Future of Health Care in
the United States, 76 Fordham L. Rev. 2297 (2008).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/facscholar/1416

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Texas A&M Law Scholarship. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Texas A&M Law Scholarship. For more
information, please contact aretteen@law.tamu.edu.

ARTICLES
ERISA, AGENCY COSTS, AND THE FUTURE OF
HEALTH CARE IN THE UNITED STATES
John Bronsteen,* Brendan S. Maher** & Peter K. Stris** *

Because so many Americans receive health insurance through their
employers, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974
plays a dominant role in the delivery of health care in the United States.
The ERISA system enables employers and insurers to save money by
providing inadequate health care to employees, thereby creating incentives
for these agents to act contrary to the interests of their principals. Such
agency costs play a significant role in the current health care crisis and
require attention when considering reform. We evaluate the two major
health care reform movements by exploring the extent to which each
reduces agency costs. We find that agency cost analysis clarifies the
benefits, limits, and uncertaintiesof each approach.
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INTRODUCTION

The very reason that most "people seek health insurance is to have
some medical security in a crisis." For the more than 50% of
American workers who receive their health insurance through an
I
ERISA-governed plan, however, such security is sorely lacking ....
On October 3, 2007, President George W. Bush issued only the fourth
veto of his seven years in office, rejecting a bill to expand health coverage
for children because it would "move [them] out of private health
insurance." 2 Such private insurance comes from employers and is the
1. Andrews-Clarke v. Travelers Ins. Co., 984 F. Supp. 49, 64 (D. Mass. 1997).
2. Michelle West, Bush Defends Veto of Congressional Children's Health Measure,
Bloomberg.com,
Oct.
6,
2007,
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=aJdihRvQcKiU&refer-worldwi
de; see also Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Carl Hulse, Bush Vetoes Child Health Bill Privately:
Later Offers Compromise on Children'sPlan, N.Y. Times, Oct. 4, 2007, at A] 8; Associated
Press, Bush Vetoes Child Health Insurance Plan: President, Congress Battle over $30
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cornerstone of health care in the United States. Support for this employerbased system is universal among leaders of both parties, whatever their
stances on certain exceptions such as programs for children.
To be sure, there is widespread agreement that American health care is in
need of reform. The leading presidential candidates all highlighted it in
their campaigns, 3 and even popular culture has taken note via Michael
Moore's recent film Sicko, the third-highest-grossing documentary on
record. 4 But both major approaches to reform-the defined contribution
movement associated primarily with President Bush and other Republicans,
and the universal care movement associated primarily with Hillary Clinton
and other Democrats-retain the basic structure of employer-sponsored care
as their backbone.
This structure, wherein people receive health insurance through the
company for which they work, is governed by the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974.5 ERISA is a labyrinthine statute,
and scholarly attempts to address health care reform have, by necessity,
delved into its intricacies. This Article confronts those intricacies, but its
ultimate ambition is to extract from them an organizing theme that explains
the problems with the status quo.
That theme is agency cost: the cost arising from a system that gives an
agent the incentive to act contrary to the interests of its principal.
Specifically, employers and insurers stand to gain by providing inadequate
health care to their employees. In this Article, we rigorously examine our
ERISA-governed health care system through the lens of agency cost and
suggest that such an approach is the most promising theoretical framework.
Part I explains the preeminent role of ERISA in the regulation, and
therefore delivery, of health care in the United States. Virtually all private
health care is paid for by employer-provided benefit plans, which are
governed by ERISA, and the preemptive sweep of the statute has nearly
foreclosed health care regulation or reform other than at the federal level.
Part II is our central theoretical contribution. Drawing upon theories of
agency that dominate the literature on economics and corporate law, we
argue that there are fundamental agency cost problems that inhere in any
ERISA-governed employee benefits plan, and that the precise nature of

for
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http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/21111931/.

http://www.hillaryclinton.com/feature/healthcareplan/?sc=8 (last visited Feb. 8, 2008); Join
Rudy 2008, http://www.joinrudy2008.com/commitment/indepth/8 (last visited Feb. 8, 2008);
Mitt Romney, Health Care, http://www.mittromney.com/Issue-Watch/HealthCare (last
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5. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26
and 29 U.S.C.).
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these ERISA agency cost problems (EACPs) is in current need of
explication and clarification. Using examples from the ERISA-governed
retirement plan context, we suggest and define two distinct types of
EACPs-asset risk and benefit risk. In our view, this conceptual
refinement supplies the theoretical tool needed to map agency analysis onto
ERISA reality.
In Part III, we argue that a significant part of our current health care crisis
is the result of unmitigated EACPs. Specifically, we maintain that the
agency cost problems that inhere in every ERISA-governed health plan are
particularly acute and largely misunderstood, that these agency cost
problems are exacerbated by the specific-and largely accidental-manner
in which ERISA has come to regulate health plans, and that the failure to
address meaningfully these agency cost problems has resulted in
fundamental problems of coverage and care.
In Part IV, we develop a taxonomy of health care reform proposals so
that our construct may be used as an evaluative heuristic. It is axiomatic
that agency risk will menace any system, like ERISA, that relies upon
conflicted fiduciaries absent countervailing safeguards of appropriate
strength. In our view, potential safeguards must be organized according to
their objectives in order to assess their ability to satisfactorily address
problems of agency cost. Our proposed taxonomy identifies three such
objectives: to improve the negotiation, terms, or policing of health plans.
Such grouping is a necessary prerequisite to the establishment of an
empirical research agenda that can address the difficult questions whose
answers must inform any considered attempt at systemic reform.
In concluding, we illustrate the power of our construct as an evaluative
heuristic by examining the two dominant movements that purport to change
fundamentally the financing and delivery of health care in this country.
Using our conception of EACPs as a framing device forces both movements
into sharper focus, exposing likely problems, revealing potential
adjustments, and prompting necessary inquiries.
I. ERISA's

INFLUENCE ON OUR HEALTH CARE SYSTEM

A. The Prevalenceof Health Care as an Employee Benefit
Most Americans are familiar with the concept of receiving health
insurance through their places of work. But it is more than common; it is
the overwhelmingly predominant way in which Americans who are neither
senior citizens nor government employees pay for their health care.
"Although the figures have fluctuated somewhat in the past decade,
employment-based coverage seems to have stabilized at approximately 65%
6
of the under-65 population, or roughly 177 million Americans."
6. David A. Hyman & Mark Hall, Two Cheers for Employment-Based Health
Insurance, 2 Yale J. Health Pol'y L. & Ethics 23, 26 (2001) (citing Robert J. Mills, U.S.
Census
Bureau,
Health
Insurance
Coverage:
2000
(2001),
available at
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It was not always this way. Before World War II, few people received
health insurance through their employers. 7 Like in many other arenas, the
war was an unintended catalyst for changes in domestic America. Because
of wage controls, wartime employers could not compete for employees by
offering more attractive wages. 8 In contrast, nonwage compensation (such
as payment of health care expenses) was free from such restrictions and was
increasingly used by employers to compete for employees. 9 After the war,
in what was undoubtedly intended as progressivism, the government made
such benefits tax free, with the enthusiastic support of employers and
labor. 10 Neither employers nor employees had to pay taxes on the money
employers contributed towards health care. This tax break, which appeared
modest at the time of enactment, has increased exponentially in size and
importance. Estimates for the
size of the current tax preference range from
1
$100 billion to $125 billion.'
The favorable tax treatment of employer-sponsored health care
encourages employers to offer (and employees to accept) generous health
packages-more generous than if the government were not picking up part
of the bill. The tax break in essence subsidizes the purchase of health
insurance through one's employer. In addition to the subsidization effect,
obtaining health insurance through the workplace permits employees access
to group plans, which, because of risk pooling, are available on more
attractive terms than are individual policies. Having become accustomed to
the tax and group advantages associated with employer plans, Americans
have long been suspicious of health care reform proposals that do away
with the employer-based model (even those that offer tax and group
advantages of their own). Although there has been much scholarly

http://www.census.gov/prod/2001pubs/p60-215.pdf; Stephen H. Long & M. Susan Marquis,
Stability and Variation in Employment-Based Health Insurance Coverage, 1993-1997, 18

Health Aff., Nov.-Dec. 1999, at 133).
7. See Clark C. Havighurst, American Health Care and the Law, in The Privatization of
Health Care Reform: Legal and Regulatory Perspectives 1, 3-4 (M. Gregg Bloche ed.,
2003); Robert B. Helms, The Tax Treatment of Health Insurance: Early History and

Evidence, 1940-1970, in Empowering Health Care Consumers Through Tax Reform 1, 7-8
(Grace-Marie Amett ed., 1999).
8. See Havighurst, supra note 7, at 3.
9. See id.; Paul L. Starr, The Social Transformation of American Medicine 311-12
(1982).
10. See Havighurst, supra note 7, at 3.
11. See, e.g., Nat'l Health Policy Forum, Retooling Tax Subsidies for Health Coverage:
Old
Ideas,
New
Politics
3
(1998),
available
at
http://www.nhpf.org/pdfs-ib/IB728TaxSubsidies_11-12-98.pdf (estimating $108 billion in
foregone revenues); John Sheils & Paul Hogan, Cost of Tax-Exempt Health Benefits in 1998,

18 Health Aff., Mar.-Apr. 1999, at 176, 178 (estimating that the tax subsidy was $124.8
billion in 1998); Leonard E. Burman et al., Tax Incentives for Health Insurance 1 (UrbanBrookings Tax Policy Ctr., Discussion Paper No.
12, 2003), available at
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/310791 _TPC_DP I2.pdf (estimating that $100 billion of

revenue is lost each year as a result of the tax preference for employer-sponsored health
benefits).
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criticism of the desirability of employment-based health insurance, 12 no
serious reform proposal moving away from this approach has come close to
realization.
B. The Primacy ofERISA in Regulating Employee Benefits
ERISA was enacted to regulate employer-sponsored benefit plans, of
which there are two kinds, "pension" and "welfare." 13 The former includes
both traditional pensions 14 as well as 401(k) plans. 15 The latter includes
plans that provide health care and disability benefits. 16
ERISA was born following a groundswell of scholarly and governmental
concern over pension security and the real-world collapse of several highprofile pension plans (notably Studebaker), leaving thousands of retired
employees broke and indignant. 17 There is little doubt that ERISA was
drafted and passed with the primary aim of protecting employees' pension

12. See, e.g., Uwe E. Reinhardt, Employer-Based Health Insurance: R.I.P., in The
Future U.S. Healthcare System: Who Will Care for the Poor and Uninsured? 325, 348-50
(Stuart H. Altman et al. eds., 1998); Alain C. Enthoven, Consumer-Centered vs. JobCenteredHealth Insurance, 57 Harv. Bus. Rev., Jan.-Feb. 1979, at 141, 151-52; Victor R.
Fuchs, The Clinton Plan: A Researcher Examines Reform, 13 Health Aff., Spring 1994, at
102, 110-11; Alain C. Enthoven, Employment-Based Health Insurance Is Failing: Now
What?, Health Aff. Web Exclusive, May, 28, 2003, at W3-237, W3-237 to W3-238,
http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/hlthaff.w3.237vl; cf Susan J. Stabile, Is It Time to
Admit the Failureof an Employer-Based Pension System?, 11 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 305
(2007) (arguing that the failures of the employer-based retirement system cannot be rectified
by incremental changes).
13. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(3) (2000) ("The term 'employee benefit plan' or 'plan' means an
employee welfare benefit plan or an employee pension benefit plan or a plan which is both
an employee welfare benefit plan and an employee pension benefit plan.").
14. ERISA defines a "pension plan" to include "any plan, fund, or
program ...established or maintained by an employer" that "(i) provides retirement
income" or "(ii) results in a deferral of income by employees." Id. § 1002(2)(A).
Traditionally, pension income was provided through what ERISA refers to as a "defined
benefit" retirement plan. Id. § 1002(35). A defined benefit plan promises to pay a fixed
retirement benefit, usually monthly, for the lives of the participant and his or her spouse.
The amount of such a benefit is typically determined pursuant to a formula that takes into
account the participant's years of service and compensation. See Employee Benefit Res.
Inst., Fundamentals of Employee Benefit Programs 56 (5th ed. 1997).
15. A 401(k) plan is the most common type of what ERISA refers to as a "defined
contribution" retirement plan. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(34); see also U.S. Dep't of Labor,
Retirement
Plans,
Benefits
&
Savings:
Types
of
Retirement
Plans,
www.dol.gov/dol/topic/retirement/typesofplans.htm (last visited Feb. 8, 2008) (explaining
that "defined contribution plans include 401(k) plans, 403(b) plans, employee stock
ownership plans, and profit-sharing plans").
16. ERISA regulates not only pension plans but also welfare plans. See supra note 13
and accompanying text. An "employee welfare benefit plan" or "welfare plan" is defined by
the statute to include "any plan, fund, or program ...established or maintained by an
employer" that provides "medical, surgical, or hospital care or benefits, or benefits in the
event of sickness, accident, disability, death or unemployment." 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1).
17. James A. Wooten, The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974: A
Political History 51-79 (2004). The second chapter of Professor Wooten's intensive
historical account is entitled "'The Most Glorious Story of Failure in the Business': The
Studebaker-Packard Corporation and the Origins of ERISA." Id. at 51.
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benefits.' 8 In contrast, welfare plans received such scant attention during
ERISA's coalescence
that some have described their inclusion as an
"afterthought."1 9
Few afterthoughts have had such momentous
consequences. In the United States today, "most health care for the
20
nonelderly is delivered through ERISA-covered employee benefit plans."
Moreover, state laws that "relate to" employee benefits plans-including
state law remedies-are expressly preempted by the statute, which provides
that ERISA "shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now
or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan." 2 1 To a degree that often
astounds the uninitiated, states have an extraordinarily limited ability to
regulate the provision and delivery of health care as financed by employersponsored plans. 22

18. Id. at 1 ("ERISA was Congress's attempt to devise a comprehensive regulatory
program to protect millions of American workers who looked to private pension plans for
financial support in their retirement years."). In the words of Congress, "[T]he growth in
size, scope, and numbers of employee benefit plans in recent years has been rapid and
substantial [and] the continued well-being and security of millions of employees and their
dependents are directly affected by these plans." 29 U.S.C. § 100 1(a).
19. Hyman & Hall, supra note 6, at 29 ("Health benefits were included in ERISA as an
afterthought, with little consideration given to whether the same regulatory framework
would work-a problem that became increasingly obvious as managed care came to
dominate the coverage market."); see also Wooten, supra note 17, at 281 ("In the political
history of pension reform, there was little discussion of employer-sponsored health plans.").
20. John H. Langbein & Bruce A. Wolk, Pension and Employee Benefit Law 892 (3d
ed. 2000); see also Lorraine Schmall & Brenda Stephens, ERISA Preemption: A Move
Towards Defederalizing Claimsfor Patients'Rights,42 Brandeis L.J. 529, 538-40 (2004).
21. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a).
22. Few topics have generated more interest from scholars and commentators in recent
years than ERISA preemption. See, e.g., Elizabeth Bamidge, What Lies Ahead for ERISA's
Preemption DoctrineAfter a JudicialCall to Action Is Issued in Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila,
43 Hous. L. Rev. 125 (2006); Phyllis C. Borzi, Distinguishing Between Coverage and
Treatment Decisions Under ERISA Health Plans: What's Left of ERISA Preemption?, 49
Buff. L. Rev. 1219 (2001); Phyllis C. Borzi, Pegram v. Herdrich: A Victoryfor HMOs or the
Beginning of the End for ERISA Preemption?, 1 Yale J. Health Pol'y L. & Ethics 161
(2001); Russell Korobkin, The FailedJurisprudenceof Managed Care, and How to Fix It:
Reinterpreting ERISA Preemption, 51 UCLA L. Rev. 457 (2003); Linda P. McKenzie,
Eligibility, Treatment, or Something In-Between? Plaintiffs Get Creative to Get Past ERISA
Preemption,23 J. Contemp. Health L. & Pol'y 272 (2007); Thomas R. McLean & Edward P.
Richards, Managed Care Liabilityfor Breach of FiduciaryDuty After Pegram v. Herdrich:
The End of ERISA Preemptionfor State Law Liabilityfor Medical CareDecision Making, 53
Fla. L. Rev. 1 (2001); Maureen McOwen, Through the Eye of the Needle: How the New York
City Health Care Security Act Will Escape ERISA Preemption, 40 Colum. J.L. & Soc. Probs.
37 (2006); Rebecca A.D. O'Reilly, Is ERISA Ready for a New Generation of State Health
Care Reform? Preemption, Innovation, and Expanding Access to Health Care Coverage, 8
U. Pa. J. Lab. & Emp. L. 387 (2006); Larry J. Pittman, A Plain Meaning Interpretationof
ERISA 's Preemption and Saving Clauses: In Support of a State Law Preemption of Section
1132(a) ofERISA's Civil Enforcement Provisions,41 San Diego L. Rev. 593 (2004); Sharon
Reece, Puncturing the Funnel-Saving the "Any Willing Provider" Statutes from ERISA
Preemption, 27 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 407 (2005); Jeffrey G. Sherman, Domestic
Partnershipand ERISA Preemption, 76 Tul. L. Rev. 373 (2001); Alex Turner, The Denial of
Benefits to the Same-Sex Domestic Partners of State Employees: How Do Claims of
DiscriminationFare Outside the Shadow of ERISA Preemption?,4 U. Pa. J. Lab. & Emp. L.
669 (2002); L. Damell Weeden, HMOs, ERISA's "Relate to" Preemption and a Patient's
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II. RETHINKING ERISA AGENCY COST PROBLEMS
Inspired by agency theories that dominate the literature of economics as
well as corporate law, we endeavor to develop a conception of EACPs that
can be used to map agency analysis onto the realities of ERISA-governed
health care. We begin from the premise that the risks attending any
ERISA-govemed employee benefit plan are the result of fundamental
agency cost problems that are largely misunderstood and currently
undertheorized. Using examples from the ERISA-governed retirement plan
context, we argue that there are two distinct types of EACPs, and that an
understanding of this distinction must inform any meaningful attempt to
evaluate and/or reform our current system of health care financing and
delivery.
A. Viewing EA CPs in Terms of Asset and Benefit Risk
An ERISA benefit plan is nothing more than the legal mechanism
through which an employer's promise of benefits is formalized and
effectuated. Indeed, an ERISA benefit plan is, in design and practice, a
form of statutory quasi trust administered by the employer (or its designees)
as a fiduciary for the employee. 2 3 Whatever the extent of ERISA's overlap
with trust law, it is undeniable that an ERISA benefit plan creates (in
economic terms) an agency relationship: the principal (i.e., the plan
participant) relies on the agent24 (i.e., the plan fiduciary) to protect and
advance the principal's interest.
Right to an External Review of Medical Necessity Decisions and the Implications of Field
and Conflict Preemption, 5 DePaul J. Health Care L. 207 (2002).
23. ERISA mandates that "all assets of an employee benefit plan shall be held in trust by
one or more trustees... [who, subject to limited exceptions,] shall have exclusive authority
and discretion to manage and control the assets of the plan." 29 U.S.C. § 1103(a).
According to the statute, "[T]he assets of a plan ...[subject to limited exceptions] shall be
held for the exclusive purposes of providing benefits to participants in the plan and their
beneficiaries and defraying reasonable expenses of administering the plan." Id. § 1103(c)(1).
The statute groups those who oversee an ERISA trust under the rubric of "fiduciary" and
provides an extremely broad definition of this term. See id. § 1002(21) (defining
"fiduciary"). Indeed, any party who "has any discretionary authority or discretionary
responsibility in the administration" of a plan is considered a fiduciary. Id.
§ 1002(21)(A)(iii). Moreover, the primary fiduciary duties under the statute are derived
from the common law of trusts. The statute codifies the common law trust principle of a duty
of loyalty by providing that "a fiduciary shall discharge his duties with respect to a plan.., for
the exclusive purpose of... providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries... [and]
defraying reasonable expenses of administering the plan." Id. § 1104(a)(1). The statute also
codifies the common law trust principle of a duty of care by providing that "a fiduciary shall
discharge his duties with respect to a plan ...with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence
under the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like capacity and
familiar with such matters would use." Id. § 11 04(a)(1)(B).
24. For purposes of this Article, we use the term "agency" as an economic or
organizational notion, i.e., agency as a relationship where the agent voluntarily and formally
acts on the principal's behalf to further the principal's interest, even if the principal lacks the
strict authority to control the agent. This usage, of course, is distinct from the legal
definition of agency, which is "the fiduciary relationship that arises when one person (a
'principal') manifests assent to another person (an 'agent') that the agent shall act on the
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With the creation of this agency comes a common problem: how can a
principal ensure the agent will serve the principal's interest rather than do
things that benefit the agent at the expense of the principal? 25 No shortage
of ink has been spilled on this subject (often called agency risk or the
agency cost problem), particularly in the literature of economics and
corporate law. 26 Far less, however, has been written about the role of
27
agency risk in the trust setting.
principal's behalf and subject to the principal's control, and the agent manifests assent or
otherwise consents so to act." Restatement (Third) of Agency § 1.01 (2006).
The
Restatement explicitly recognizes that it has adopted a narrow definition, noting that
"terminology of agency is widely used in commercial settings and academic literature to
characterize relationships that are not necessarily encompassed by the legal definition of
agency." Id. § 1.01 cmt. b.; see also Gail B. Agrawal, Resuscitating Professionalism: SelfRegulation in the Medical Marketplace, 66 Mo. L. Rev. 341, 371 (2001) (discussing the
legal concept of agency with reference to an employer's purchasing of health insurance for
employees).
25. There is an old story, originally told by American essayist Elbert Hubbard,
concerning a principal, an agent named Rowan, and an opposing general named Garcia.
According to the story, war had broken out, with the President in command of the
government and (General) Garcia in command of the guerilla forces. The President had an
idea for ending the war and needed to communicate urgently with Garcia. Garcia's location
was unknown and he was thus not reachable by mail or phone. When the President asked his
advisors how he could reach Garcia, he was told there was a man named Rowan who could
deliver the President's message. The President summoned Rowan, gave him the written
message, and told him to deliver it to Garcia. Rowan did not ask where Garcia was, how he
was to get the letter to Garcia, or how long it would take. Rowan simply took the letter,
traversed land and sea, camped in the hills, entered hostile territory, tracked down Garcia,
and delivered the message to him. Hubbard's story celebrates an agent who asks no
questions, makes no objections, requests no help, and endures great personal hardship, but
nonetheless accomplishes his principal's daunting task. If all agents were like Rowan, there
would be no principal-agent problem. But commentators have long acknowledged that
agents like Rowan are, if not unique, then extremely rare. Those commentators include
Hubbard himself. For agents other than Rowan, he observed, "Slipshod assistance, foolish
inattention, dowdy indifference, and half-hearted work seem the rule; and no [principal]
succeeds, unless by hook or crook or threat he forces or bribes other men to assist him."
Elbert Hubbard, A Message to Garcia: Being a Preachment 7-8 (East Aurora, N.Y., The
Roycrofters 1899).
26. See, e.g., George S. Geis, Business Outsourcingand the Agency Cost Problem, 82
Notre Dame L. Rev. 955 (2007). For general background on agency theory including
discussion of agency risk, see, for example, Kenneth J. Arrow, The Economics of Agency, in
Principals and Agents: The Structure of Business 37 (John W. Pratt & Richard J. Zeckhauser
eds., 1985); Kathleen M. Eisenhardt, Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review, 14 Acad.
Mgmt. Rev. 57 (1989); Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J.
Pol. Econ. 288 (1980); Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, An Analysis of the PrincipalAgent Problem, 51 Econometrica 7 (1983).
27. In a recent work, Professor Robert H. Sitkoff cogently argued that agency theory can
be used to explain fundamental problems that inhere in the donative trust setting. See Robert
H. Sitkoff, An Agency Costs Theory of Trust Law, 89 Cornell L. Rev. 621, 623 (2004)
(noting that "[a]gency cost theories of the firm dominate the modern literature of corporate
law and economics" but that "the private express trust, an entity from which the corporation
traces its roots, has been left largely untouched by agency cost analysis" (footnotes
omitted)). The agency risks that inhere in the donative trust setting (where the default
presumption is a neutral trustee) are far more acute in the world of ERISA-governed welfare
plans. This is so because ERISA expressly permits the selection of a conflicted trustee. See
Daniel Fischel & John H. Langbein, ERISA's Fundamental Contradiction: The Exclusive
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In drafting ERISA, Congress presumably hoped to protect against agency
risk by adopting a modified version of preexisting trust law. 28 But the
importation of trust law was far from complete; indeed, perhaps the most
serious default presumption in trust law-that the fiduciary have no
financial interest in the delivery of trust distributions-is utterly absent
from the statute. 29 To the contrary, ERISA specifically permits the
employer to employ or control the plan fiduciary. 30 To that, we will return
shortly.
Generally speaking, agency risk threatens principals because it increases
the likelihood that the principal's objectives will be achieved at a higher
cost than necessary, or not at all. The beginning point in any contextual
analysis of agency risk is to enumerate the subject principal's expectations
for the agent, and then to consider the specific agency risk that may threaten
the realization of each expectation.
In the ERISA setting, a principal's expectations can, for our purposes, be
grouped into two categories. What we refer to as the "benefit expectation"
is the expectation that promised benefits will be properly conferred to the
employee. By contrast, what we refer to as the "asset expectation" is the
expectation that the fiduciary will carefully protect and manage either (1)
assets to which the participant has a direct entitlement or (2) assets that
underlie a promise of benefits. 3 1 Which of these expectations arises
Benefit Rule, 55 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1105, 1126 (1988) ("The statute leaves the plan sponsor to
pick the fiduciary and, if the sponsor pleases, to do it from the ranks of management.
Sponsors routinely exercise this authority."). The explicit scholarly recognition of agency
cost problems in the ERISA setting is largely focused on problems of agency that attend the
employer's purchase of insurance and initial selection of benefits. See, e.g., Agrawal, supra
note 24, at 370-72; Dayna Bowen Matthew, Controlling the Reverse Agency Costs of
Employment-Based Health Insurance: Of Markets, Courts, and a Regulatory Quagmire, 31
Wake Forest L. Rev. 1037 (1996). Such issues are, of course, distinct from the agency cost
problems associated with a conflicted fiduciary as plan operator and administrator.
28. John H. Langbein, What ERISA Means by "Equitable":The Supreme Court's Trail
of Error in Russell, Mertens, and Great-West, 103 Colum. L. Rev. 1317, 1324 (2003)
("[W]hen confronting abuse in plan administration, Congress was able to adapt the longfamiliar trust model as the regulatory regime."); see also Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S.
489, 496 (1996) (noting that the duties imposed by ERISA on plan fiduciaries "draw much
of their content from the common law of trusts, the law that governed most benefit plans
before ERISA's enactment" (citations omitted)); Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489
U.S. 101, 110 (1989). The periodic reference to "administration risk" in the work of
Professor Langbein unquestionably implicates notions of agency. Targeting a wholly
different objective, however, Professor Langbein does not seek to overlay agency theory
onto ERISA in such a way so as to build an accessible evaluative construct. This is
evidenced by the very choice of the phrase "administration risk," which, while quite useful
for other purposes, fails to reflect the various manifestations of ERISA agency cost problems
(EACPs) that afflict different plan types and structures.
29. See Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 170(1) (1959). But see id. § 170(1) cmt. t
(noting that self-dealing is authorized if permitted by the terms of the trust).
30. See supra note 27.
31. Commentators often describe all plans under ERISA as being either of the "defined
benefit" or "defined contribution" variety. These terms are present in the statute. 29 U.S.C.
§ 1002(34) (2006) ("defined contribution"); id. § 1002(35) ("defined benefit"); see also U.S.
Dep't of Labor, supra note 15 (explaining the difference between a defined benefit plan and
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depends on the plan structure. For example, a 401(k) plan implicates the
asset expectation; a traditional pension plan implicates both the asset and
benefit expectations. Having defined the principal's asset and benefit
expectations, we need now explore the corresponding risks that the
principal's expectations will be frustrated.
1. Asset Risk
In a 401(k) plan, an employee is assigned an individual account within
the plan to which money is contributed by the employee and/or the
employer. 32 A participant's allocated assets are owned and controlled by
the plan, subject to its duties to the employee, 33 until the moment they are
withdrawn from the plan by a participant or beneficiary. Although some, if
not most, plans provide participants with investment choices, the actual
investment transactions are undertaken by plan fiduciaries. Indeed, any
alternative arrangement would cause a 401(k) plan to lose its tax-preferred
34
status under § 401 of the Internal Revenue Code.
The principal's expectation is that the fiduciary will properly manage the
funds allocated to the principal's account. The most prominent agency risk
here is that the fiduciary will mishandle plan funds, either through outright
theft or more likely by making imprudent investment decisions or ignoring
a participant's instructions, resulting in a decrease in plan asset value. In
modern America, the risk of outright theft, thankfully, is low, no doubt
because theft is morally repugnant, easy to ascertain, and likely to result in
criminal penalties for its practitioners. Fund mismanagement and/or selfdealing are the primary asset risks faced by employees participating in
401 (k) plans or other individual account vehicles.
A traditional pension is also threatened by asset risk. Although such a
pension is a promise of benefits legally unrelated to the performance of the
assets that back that promise, from a pure agency perspective there is still
an asset expectation, namely that the promisor will properly manage the
assets backing the pension promise such that it will be able to pay a valid
benefit sought by the principal. The risk is that the promisor will manage
a defined contribution plan). While useful in describing to which party certain types of risk
are allocated, this distinction is of limited value in analyzing and grouping the agency risks
that arise under ERISA.
32. A 401(k) plan is one type of defined contribution plan. See supra note 15. Unlike a
defined benefits retirement plan, a defined contribution retirement plan does not promise a
specific amount of benefits. Instead, an employee who participates in a defined contribution
plan is assigned an individual account within the plan to which money is contributed by the
employee and/or his employer. 29 U.S.C. § 1102(34). For this reason, ERISA uses the terms
"defined contribution plan" and "individual account plan" interchangeably. Id.
33. See, e.g., supra note 23.
34. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 89-52, 1989-1 C.B. 110, 111 ("While a qualified trust may
permit a participant to elect how amounts attributable to the participant's account balance
will be invested, it may not allow the participant to have the right to acquire, hold and
dispose of amounts attributable to the participant's account balance at will." (citation
omitted)).
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the underlying assets so badly that there will be insufficient money
remaining to pay benefits. Precisely that brand of asset risk was what in
large part impelled the enactment of ERISA-several high-profile
traditional pension plans lacked sufficient assets to meet their pension
promises and defaulted, leaving retirees holding the bag. 35
2. Benefit Risk
Unlike a 401(k) plan, a traditional pension plan is a promise of a
particular benefit. Accordingly, the employee's expectation is twofold: (1)
that the fiduciary will have the financial wherewithal to live up to the
promise (as explained above) and (2) that the fiduciary will fairly confer
promised benefits.
Thus, in addition to the risk that theft or
mismanagement of assets underlying the promise could make benefits
financially unavailable, the traditional pensioner also faces the risk that,
during the benefit conferral process, the agent will shirk his duties and
advance his own interests-an agency hazard present regardless of the
health of the assets backing the benefit promise. There are many ways for
an agent to shirk conferring the promised benefit. Certainly one type of
undesirable agent behavior is that the fiduciary is indolent or incompetent in
conferring benefits, i.e., inaccurately calculating the pension amount. This
behavior often occurs. But a more pernicious risk is one that arises because
of the way ERISA permits benefit plans to be administered.
The decision whether to confer a benefit is zero-sum: the promisor keeps
one dollar less for every dollar paid in benefits. 36 In contrast to traditional
trust law, where the trustee is designedly impartial, ERISA permits plan
fiduciaries to employ or control the party who makes benefit
determinations. 37 Because every benefit decision is a zero-sum game with
the agent on one side and the principal on the other, the obvious risk is that

35. This type of benefit risk (i.e., that a fiduciary will not have the financial ability to
live up to the benefit promise) is often referred to as "default risk." At the time ERISA was
enacted, default risk was a severe problem in the context of traditional (i.e., defined benefit)
retirement plans. Langbein, supra note 28, at 1322. This is not surprising "because [a
defined benefit] plan promises today's worker to pay benefits far in the future." Id. Thus,
before benefits are actually paid, "the plan can become insolvent, or it can renege in other
ways on the pension promise." Id. Default risk was a substantial concern in 1974 because
the pension system at that time was dominated by defined benefit plans. Wooten, supra note
17, at 278 ("As late as 1979, more than 80 percent of individuals who participated in a
private retirement plan were in a defined-benefit plan," and such plans "held assets valued at
roughly two and one-half times the value of assets held by... defined-contribution plans.").
Today, default risk has all but been eliminated because of ERISA. See Langbein, supra note
28, at 1322.
36. This is true regardless of who is making the decision on benefits, i.e., even an
impartial third party making the decision will either grant benefits (in which case the plan
sponsor pays) or deny benefits (in which case the plan sponsor keeps the money). The plan
participant's loss is the plan sponsor's gain. In contrast, asset decisions (except for selfdealing and theft) are not zero-sum. The asset decision maker does not gain a dollar for
every dollar the participant's 401(k) declines in value.
37. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
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the agent will deny otherwise valid benefits to better itself.38 We call this
facet of benefits risk "zero-sum" agency risk.
Many disputes involving traditional pension plans have arisen because of
such zero-sum agency risk. One such example reached the U.S. Supreme
Court in the 2006 Term. 39 Although this case is the most recent example of
zero-sum agency risk leading to pension litigation over the "benefit
expectation," it is by no means the first. For example, litigation has
resulted when an employer reduces employees' wages, terminates the
employees, and then argues that the employees' severance plan benefits
should be calculated at the reduced rate. 40 Similarly, disputes regularly
have arisen when an employer has sold a division to another firm and then
argued that employees who continue to work for the acquiring firm are not
entitled to benefits under the selling company's severance plan. 4 1 Such
conflict has persisted for many years.42
Zero-sum agency risk is enhanced greatly if the benefit conferral requires
an exercise of discretion concerning the claimant's "eligibility" for the
sought benefit under the governing policy. 43 Accordingly, conflicted
fiduciaries have an incentive to exercise creatively that discretion in ways
that favor the fiduciary rather than the beneficiary. Although there are
several ways to deal with this risk, as discussed in Part II.B of this Article,
the only way to eliminate zero-sum agency risk is to prohibit fiduciaries
from exercising any control over the party administering benefits.

38. See infra Part III.A.
39. Beck v. PACE Int'l Union, 127 S. Ct. 2310, 2321 (2007) (unanimously holding that
"merger is not a permissible method of terminating a single-employer defined-benefit
pension plan").
40. See, e.g., Ahne v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 640 F. Supp. 912, 914 (E.D. Wis. 1986).
41. Compare Harris v. Pullman Standard, Inc., 809 F.2d 1495, 1496 (11th Cir. 1987),
and Blau v. Del Monte Corp., 748 F.2d 1348, 1350 (9th Cir. 1984), with Simmons v.
Diamond Shamrock Chem. Co., 658 F. Supp. 1053, 1054 (E.D. Mo. 1987), affd, 844 F.2d
517 (8th Cir. 1988), and Jung v. FMC Corp., 755 F.2d 708, 709 (9th Cir. 1985).
42. Almost twenty years ago, two prominent scholars described the cases cited in supra
notes 40 and 41 as examples where "at the margin there can be doubt about how particular
plan terms apply to particular circumstances." Fischel & Langbein, supra note 27, at 1129.
43. An example from the traditional pension setting should illustrate this point.
Litigation over a defined pension benefit rarely involves a claim that the fiduciary paid
mathematically less than what was owed, i.e., that the fiduciary did not obey the formula
governing the pension calculation. Fiduciaries are unlikely to violate clear rules governing
benefit entitlement, because there will almost certainly be significant reputational
consequences that result from such behavior. In general terms, this can be expressed as
follows: agency risk still exists in a zero-sum game absent discretion, but it is far less
dangerous because agents are more likely to face reputational risks from opportunistic
behavior (as well as liability risks). When there is room for interpretation regarding how the
agent should act, i.e., when the agent has discretion, behavior adverse to a given principal is
less likely to negatively affect the agent's reputation, because observers may attribute the
agent's decision to an unfavorable but unbiased interpretation of the rule. No such
reputational protection exists for parties whose actions unquestionably violate clear rules.
People may be willing to deal with wily operators, but few are willing to deal with out-andout cheaters. This is true even if no government-imposed penalty (either statutory or at
common law) for the rule breaking exists.
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B. ERISA's DisparateRegulation of Asset and Benefit Risk
ERISA contains a number of provisions designed to address asset risk,
particularly in the retirement setting. ERISA created the Pension Benefit
Guaranty Corporation (PBGC), a federal entity that guarantees traditional
pensions should the company backing the pension default on its
obligations. 44 The PBGC is the pension cousin of the well-known Federal
45
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), which insures bank accounts.
ERISA also sets forth minimum funding requirements on companies
46
offering defined benefit pensions to decrease the likelihood of default.
As noted above, ERISA imposes upon fiduciaries the duties of loyalty
and care imported from the common law of trusts. 47 In addition to
codifying these common law fiduciary duties in general terms, ERISA also
provides some specific examples of these duties in the plan management
context. For example, the statute specifically provides that a plan fiduciary
must "diversify[] the investments of the plan so as to minimize the risk of
large losses, unless under the circumstances it is clearly prudent not to do
The statute also provides that a plan fiduciary must act "in
so." 4 8
accordance with the documents and instruments governing the plan" unless
such documents are inconsistent with ERISA. 49 ERISA also strictly
prohibits transactions and asset transfers between the fiduciary and the
plan. 50 These duties and prohibitions directly address concerns of fiduciary
theft and mismanagement.
ERISA has done considerably less to deal with benefit risk. 5 1 The statute
does have some provisions intended to deal with this species of agency risk.
For example, it imposes vesting requirements upon traditional pension
plans, which address benefit risk by imposing nondiscretionary, ex ante
standards upon fiduciaries that prevent the use of lengthy vesting periods
and subsequent termination as a means of avoiding the payment of
44. See Langbein, supra note 28, at 1323 (observing that "[a]ll defined benefit plans
must pay a premium per covered participant into a fund administered by an ERISA-created
government agency.., which guarantees the payment of most benefits promised under
defined benefit plans").
45. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) is "[a]n independent agency of
the federal government [that] was created in 1933 in response to the thousands of bank
failures that occurred in the 1920s and early 1930s." FDIC, Who Is the FDIC?,
http://www.fdic.gov/about/learn/symbol/index.html

(last visited Feb 8., 2008). The agency

"insur[es] deposits in banks and thrift institutions for at least $100,000," and it "identilfies],
monitor[s] and address[es] risks to the deposit insurance funds." Id. Accordingly, "no
depositor has lost a single cent of insured funds as a result of a failure" since the corporation
began to offer insurance in 1934. Id.
46. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1081-1086 (2006).
47. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
48. 29 U.S.C. § l104(a)(1)(C).
49. Id. § 1104(a)(1)(D).
50. Id. § 1106.
51. Minimum funding requirements and guaranty corporations do not alleviate benefit
risk; nor have the enumerated fiduciary duties in ERISA, balanced as they are against the
fact that ERISA permits as a startingpoint a nonneutral fiduciary, been practically applied
in a way that meaningfully confronts benefit risk.
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benefits. 52 The statute also empowers a participant or beneficiary of any
ERISA-governed plan to initiate civil litigation "to recover benefits due to
him under the terms of his plan, to enforce his rights under the terms of the
53
plan, or to clarify his rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan."
But these limits on benefit risk are overshadowed by ERISA's statutory
tolerance of conflicted fiduciaries. Indeed, ERISA's failure to prohibit a
conflicted fiduciary is the primary reason that benefit risk plagues ERISA
plans. Other than those situations in which the fiduciary's discretion is
limited and ex ante rules can serve as a prophylactic, a participant is
vulnerable to opportunistic behavior by fiduciaries. This problem requires
careful attention because, as noted above, benefits determinations are zerosum and frequently turn on the discretion of a conflicted fiduciary. As
discussed in Part III of this Article, discretion is most frequently implicated
(and thus a more frequent danger to the participant) in the health care
context.
III. THE ROLE OF EACPs IN OUR HEALTH CARE CRISIS
We have argued that fundamental agency cost problems inhere in any
ERISA-govemed employee benefits plan. Next, we contend that EACPs
are responsible for a significant part of our current health care crisis. In
Part III.A, we maintain that the agency cost problems that inhere in every
ERISA-governed health plan are particularly acute and largely
misunderstood. In Part III.B, we identify various features of ERISA that
exacerbate EACPs. In Part III.C, we suggest that the failure to address
meaningfully these agency cost problems has resulted in fundamental
problems of coverage and care.
A. The MisunderstoodProblem of Health CareBenefit Risk
EACPs in ERISA-governed health care are acute and misunderstood.
Benefit risk in the health care setting is acute because benefit
determinations often involve discretion, 54 fiduciaries have explicit
discretion to make benefits determinations, 55 and a determination is a zerosum game where fiduciaries lose by granting benefits. Benefit risk in the
health care setting also is misunderstood because there is considerable
52. Id. §§ 1051-1061.

53. Id. § 1132(a)(1)(B). Unlike most civil litigation authorized by ERISA, a lawsuit
brought pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) may be filed in either federal or state court.
See id. § 1132(e)(1) (noting that, "[e]xcept for actions under subsection (a)(1)(B) of this
section, the district courts of the United States shall have exclusive jurisdiction," but that
"[s]tate courts of competent jurisdiction and district courts of the United States shall have
concurrent jurisdiction of actions under paragraph[] (1)(B). ..of this section"). However,
the remedies available to a participant or beneficiary under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) are
extremely limited. See infra notes 70-72 and accompanying text.
54. The problem is less acute in the retirement setting, where benefits risk exists but is
not as pervasive because the conferral of benefits less frequently involves the same level of
discretion. See supra note 43.
55. See infra Part III.C.
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complexity in the ways in which health plans are funded and administered.
There are three ways in which a health plan may be funded under ERISA.
As explained below, zero-sum agency risk inheres in every ERISA health
plan, regardless of which of these funding methods is employed.
1. Self-insured Plans
Under ERISA, an employer is permitted to establish a welfare plan,
pursuant to which the employer assumes the cost of paying for all promised
benefits. 56 In other words, the employer is not required to purchase thirdparty insurance.
ERISA does not require that employers who self-insure set aside
segregated funds for such a plan.57 Accordingly, one arrangement is pure
self-funding, in which the employer pays 100% of the cost associated with
providing benefits out of its general treasury. Under such an arrangement,
the employer is directly and immediately sensitive to the zero-sum nature of
benefit payments. In this circumstance, an employer may choose one of its
own employees as plan administrator, in which case the zero-sum agency
risk is obvious because the administrator's judgment is at some level biased
or
in favor of the bottom line of the entity that pays him, either explicitly
58
through an unconscious desire not to "bite the hand that feeds him."
56. 29 U.S.C. § 1081(a)(1); see also Donald T. Bogan, ERISA: Re-thinking Firestone in
Light of Great-West-Implicationsfor Standard of Review and the Right to a Jury Trial in
Welfare Benefit Claims, 37 J. Marshall L. Rev. 629, 633 n.21 (2004) (explaining that welfare
plans, unlike pension plans, may be "funded through the establishment of a trust, or through
the purchase of insurance, or plans can be unfunded").
57. Such plans are commonly called "unfunded plans." See Bogan, supra note 56, at 633
n.21.
58. Some commentators argue that health care benefits risk is limited because an
employer, and hence its administrator employees, has a reputational incentive to award
benefits so that the employer may keep and attract employees. See, e.g., Mers v. Marriott
Int'l Group Accidental Death and Dismemberment Plan, 144 F.3d 1014, 1021 (7th Cir.
1998) (noting that "it is a poor business decision to resist paying meritorious claims for
benefits"). This argument at best lessens the agency risk, and the degree to which it does so
is unclear. First, many employers offer no health plans at all, and yet still attract quality
employees. Surely an employer who offered a health plan that provided, in practice,
unexpectedly sparse benefits would still be able to attract quality labor that preferred some
benefits over perhaps superior wages at an employer with no plan. Second, opportunistic
manipulation of the benefit determination process need not result in routine benefit denial, or
even denial at all; there are many ways in which agency risk may manifest itself that are
subtle enough not to result in a reputationally costly perception of bias. Only obviously
biased decisions are likely to damage the company's reputation. Moreover, significant
reputational costs arise only to the extent that other workers are aware that biased denials
(known to the victim) are occurring, and it is not clear how likely it is that this information
would be made widely available to workers beyond those who suffered obviously biased
treatment. Third, employers presumably face equal if not more pressure to keep down their
cost of goods, because consumers can easily discriminate based on the price of the offered
good or service. Thus, to the extent an employer needs to choose between (1) inflicting a
difficult to ascertain "benefit manipulation cost" on its workers-who would be burdened
with significant transaction costs if they wanted to change employment and who might be
unable to communicate that cost to other current or prospective workers-and (2) bearing
the cost of awarding benefits and then inflicting any increased cost of doing business on
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Agency hazard also remains present if an unfunded plan retains a third
party to administer benefits. If a third-party administrator's compensation
is negatively tied to the amount of benefits awarded, as some are, then there
is an obvious agency risk present. Even if a third-party administrator's fee
is unrelated to the benefits awarded, however, the employer has an
incentive to select administrators who keep its benefit costs down. For this
reason, third-party administrators have an incentive to favor the employer in
their determinations to increase the likelihood the employer continues to
59
engage them.
Another option for employers who wish to self-fund is to create a
segregated trust for the payment of claims. Agency risk is present here for
two reasons. First, the employer's promise to pay benefits is not limited to
the amount of money in the trust; any excess benefit claims come out of the
employer's treasury. 60 Second, and more importantly, the employer funds
the trust, and thus, to the extent any self-favoring benefit manipulation
results in the trust running a surplus, that lessens the future amount the
employer needs to contribute. A benefits dollar opportunistically denied
today is a dollar less that need be added to the pot at the next trust-funding
interval.
Self-insurance only makes financial sense for employers who "have a
pool of individual risks sufficiently large to minimize [their] insurance risk,
reducing the value of purchasing third-party insurance." 6 1 Because selfconsumers through higher prices for the sold good or service, employers would choose the
former, because the risk of losing a consumer to a competitor's cheaper substitute good or
service is greater than the risk of losing a worker or being unable to replace him.
59. Some observers have suggested that health care benefit risk is limited because
benefit determinations are made by persons, not entities, and the determiner's personal
interests may differ from the sponsoring employer. See, e.g., Perlman v. Swiss Bank Corp.
Comprehensive Disability Prot. Plan, 195 F.3d 975, 981 (7th Cir. 1999) (noting the difficulty
for an entity to get employees to act exclusively in the company's interest). That a plan
administrator's personal incentives may not be aligned perfectly with his employer's may
serve as an outer limit on the administrator's exercise of discretion in favor of the employer,
such that grossly immoral decisions would be avoided. Yet there is little reason to believe
an administrator's personal incentives, to the extent that they diverge from his employer's,
are likely to cut in favor of the employee, as the administrator secures no personal advantage
for awarding benefits. At best, this argument shows that the administrator's divergent
personal value system may operate to lessen the magnitude of agency risk faced by the
beneficiary, not that there is no risk at all. Moreover, the more significant the overall cost of
benefits is to the company's financial health, presumably the larger the overlap of incentive
between the administrator and the employer, whose fortunes are entwined-and all parties
agree that the cost of health benefits is significant to virtually every employer.
60. See Donald T. Bogan & Benjamin Fu, ERISA: No Further Inquiry into Conflicted
Plan Administrator Claim Denials, 58 Okla. L. Rev. 637, 639 n.8 (2005) ("If the plan trust is
unable to satisfy all of the plan beneficiaries' claims, the plan sponsor usually must either
replenish the trust, if one exists, or pay the benefits directly out of its general treasury.").
61. Russell Korobkin, The Battle over Self-Insured Health Plans, or "One Good
Loophole Deserves Another," 5 Yale J. Health Pol'y L. & Ethics 89, 106-07 (2005). See
generally Gail A. Jensen, Kevin D. Cotter & Michael A. Morrisey, State Insurance
Regulation and Employers' Decisions to Self-Insure, 62 J. Risk & Ins. 185 (1995). For a
historical account of how the "savings" and "deemer" clauses came to be included in ERISA
so as to address welfare plans, see Wooten, supra note 17, at 235-36, 256, 258-59.
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insured plans are entirely immune from state regulation, however, there is a
substantial noneconomic reason to self-insure. 62 Small employers have
been able to offer health plans that qualify as self-insured under ERISA
without exposing themselves to an unreasonable amount of financial risk by
purchasing what is called stop-loss insurance. A stop-loss policy is simply
an insurance policy that pays the employer for costs incurred above an
agreed upon stop-loss point. 63 If an employer who has chosen to sponsor a
self-insured plan with stop-loss insurance that is administered by a designee
of the employer, the zero-sum agency risk is obvious as to all benefit
64
decisions made prior to the time that the stop-loss minimum is reached.
For benefits above the stop-loss point, agency risk arises because the
employer fears increased stop-loss premiums with each benefit award. If
the stop-loss insurer administers the plan, the incentive is to globally
manipulate the benefit process such that the benefits awards are unlikely to
exceed the employer's minimum point.
2. Insured Plans
In cases where the plan fiduciary transfers both the administrative and
insurance role to a third-party insurance company, the agency risk likely
exceeds that of all other arrangements. The reason is that the third-party
administrator/insurer is faced with the same zero-sum incentive as a selfinsurer/administrator, and yet the third-party insurance company is more
insulated from reputational damage than is the employer itself, owing to
information asymmetry and the position of victimized beneficiaries. As the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has explained,
[W]hile in a perfect world, employees might pressure their companies to
switch from self-dealing insurers, there are likely to be problems of
imperfect information and information flow. Employees typically do not
have access to information about claim-denying by insurance companies,
and the relationship between employees and insurance companies is quite
attenuated; so long as obviously meritorious claims are well-handled, it is
unlikely that an insurance company's business will suffer because of its
client's employees' dissatisfaction. Additionally, many claims for
benefits are made after individuals have left active employment and are

62. See, e.g., L. Darnell Weeden, Tactical Self-Funded ERISA Employers Unnecessarily
Threaten Employees' Right to an Independent Review of an HMO's Medical Necessity
Determination with Preemption, 77 St. John's L. Rev. 867, 884 (2003) (noting that ERISA
preemption jurisprudence "may lead some employers to change to unfunded employee
benefit plans to avoid ERISA's insurance saving clause").
63. Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Labor, Definitions of Health Insurance
Terms 6 (n.d.), available at http://stats.bls.gov/ncs/ebs/sp/healthterms.pdf (providing
definitions used by the Interdepartmental Committee on Employment-Based Health
Insurance Surveys).
64. See, e.g., Smathers v. Multi-Tool, Inc./Multi-Plastics, Inc., 298 F.3d 191, 199 (3d
Cir. 2002) (holding that, where employer uses stop-loss insurance, there is a conflict because
"the employer is directly funding a portion of the plan and is benefitted by denying the
claims").

20081

ERISA, AGENCY COSTS, AND HEALTH CARE

2315

seeking pension or disability benefits. Details about the handling of those

to seep into the
claims, whether responsible or irresponsible, are unlikely
65
collective knowledge of the still-active employees.

Of course, the Third Circuit's observations apply with even more force to
manifestations of agency risk far more subtle than opportunistic denying of
claims, which we discuss below.
B. ERISA's Failureto Address Health Care Benefit Risk

ERISA does not require that employers offer benefit plans; it merely
imposes certain requirements upon an offered plan that vary with the plan
type. The pertinent requirements for welfare plans are as follows: (1) the
plan must be written and certain plan information disclosed to plan
participants; 66 (2) the plan must be administered by a named fiduciary,
designated by the employer;6 7 (3) the fiduciary and any cofiduciaries must
observe certain fiduciary duties and administer the plan "solely in the
interest" of plan participants and beneficiaries; 68 and (4) benefit denials
must be in writing and subject to internal review by the fiduciary.69 The
limited utility of these requirements should be apparent, because ERISA, as
we have emphasized throughout, does not require that the welfare plan
administrator be financially independent of the employer. Nor does ERISA
impose financial or solvency requirements upon welfare plans or restrict the
employer's (i.e., the plan sponsor's) choices regarding how to fund the plan.
ERISA does include remedies that are available to those harmed as a
result of a violation of ERISA's substantive provisions, including a remedy
for benefit denial. 70 But the Supreme Court has held ERISA's remedial
provisions to be the "exclusive" remedies available to redress injuries
arising from ERISA violations, and remedies such as traditional
consequential or punitive damages-which are not named in ERISA's
remedial provisions-cannot be implied. 7 1 Accordingly, the relief available
65. Pinto v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 214 F.3d 377, 388 (3d Cir. 2000).
66. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-1024, 1102 (2006).
67. Id. § 1102(a)(1)-(2).
68. Id. § 1104(a)(1).
69. The U.S. Code provides,
In accordance with regulations of the Secretary, every employee benefit plan
shall(1) provide adequate notice in writing to any participant or beneficiary
whose claim for benefits under the plan has been denied, setting forth the
specific reasons for such denial, written in a manner calculated to be
understood by the participant, and
(2) afford a reasonable opportunity to any participant whose claim for
benefits has been denied for a full and fair review by the appropriate named
fiduciary of the decision denying the claim.
Id. § 1133.
70. Id. § 1132.
71. See, e.g., Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 54 (1987) ("The deliberate

care with which ERISA's civil enforcement remedies were drafted.., argue strongly for the
conclusion that ERISA's civil enforcement remedies were intended to be exclusive."); Mass.
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to a plaintiff suing for an improper denial of welfare benefits is limited to
receiving the denied benefit or the value thereof (with the possibility of
attorneys' fees, awarded at the court's discretion).
Put simply, ERISA's
72
remedies undercompensate and underdeter.
C. The Consequencesfor our Health Care System
The health care market can be thought to have three categories of players:
patient, provider, and payor. The patient receives medical services; the
provider physically supplies them; and the payor pays for them. Prior to the
passage of ERISA in the 1970s and steeply rising medical costs in the
1980s and 1990s, the traditional health insurance model was the "indemnity
model." In the indemnity model, the patient chose a physician, the
physician chose the appropriate medical services, and the payor (the
insurer) paid the physician's "fee-for-service." This model, with little to no
insurer involvement regarding the appropriate provision of services, has
been largely displaced. Currently, insurers exercise a great deal of control
over the type, amount, quality, and cost of the services provided. Inherent
in such insurer control is a great deal of zero-sum agency risk. We discuss
below the primary ways in which this agency risk has manifested itself.
1. Agency Risk and Issues of Coverage
Insurers and self-insured plans now routinely include in their contracts
the following provisions: (1) a clause that only "medically necessary"
treatment is covered, (2) a clause excluding "experimental" treatments, and
(3) a clause reserving the discretion to make such judgments to the
insurer. 73 The process by which insurers make these determinations for a
74
proposed treatment is known as "utilization review."
The agency risk in utilization review is significant. Because utilization
review is discretionary and often involves expert analysis as to whether a
particular treatment is "medically necessary" or experimental, such adverse
discretionary determinations in the utilization review setting are less likely
75
to incur reputational costs than are flat denials of clearly covered services.
Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 146 (1985) ("The six carefully integrated civil
enforcement provisions found in § 502(a) of the statute as finally enacted.., provide strong
evidence that Congress did not intend to authorize other remedies that it simply forgot to
incorporate expressly.").
72. The lack of such damages-which are generally available against self-serving
fiduciaries in non-ERISA contexts-highlights why agency cost poses a more profound risk
in the world of ERISA than outside of it. Insufficient deterrence encourages errant behavior.
73. See Jennifer Arlen & W. Bentley McLeod, MalpracticeLiabilityfor Physicians and
Managed Care Organizations, 78 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1929, 1971-72 (2003); Mark A. Hall &
Gerard F. Anderson, Health Insurers' Assessment of Medical Necessity, 140 U. Pa. L. Rev.
1637, 1647 (1992).
74. Hall & Anderson, supra note 73, at 1652-53.
75. See generally id. Professors Mark A. Hall and Gerard F. Anderson assess whether

insurers should be allowed "to control health care costs by denying payment for specific
services based on the insurers' judgments of medical appropriateness," id. at 1641-42, and
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Indeed, utilization review need not result in complete denial of the sought
benefit; often denial of a specific sought treatment is coupled with the
insurer's approval of an alternate, less costly treatment. If the patient, on
account of his inability to self-pay for the desired treatment, accepts the
alternative treatment, it is not difficult for the insurance company to boast
of the high rate of "coverage" its policy affords-the patient, after all,
received treatment. Moreover, if the patient accepts the alternative
treatment and his condition does not improve or worsen, there is little
litigation risk to the insurance company. ERISA both denies plaintiffs the
right to collect traditional consequential or punitive damages in such
circumstances and denies states the ability to supply that additional
remedy. 76 Indeed, if the patient wishes to receive the denied treatment, his
only option is to pursue an injunction to obtain that benefit. Such litigation
is costly, time-consuming, and not amenable to contingent fee
representation, making it very difficult for all but the wealthiest patients to
challenge a payor's self-serving determinations. 7 7 And, again, even if such
a patient declines the alternative, self-pays, and then seeks reimbursement,
the insurance company is on the hook primarily for the cost of the treatment
and, in rare circumstances, attorneys' fees.
2. Agency Risk and Issues of Care
Another EACP is that payors will set up payment systems that
incentivize physicians to underprovide care. 78 Such systems have the
propose that coverage disputes be resolved via contractually agreed, nonjudicial process, id.
at 1683-89.
76. E.g., Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321, 1322-24 (5th Cir. 1992)
(affirming the dismissal of a lawsuit for the wrongful death of an unborn child even though
the employer denied hospitalization for the woman who, according to both her personal
physician and an independent physician consulted by the employer, required complete bed
rest and around-the-clock monitoring, where the fetus died while the woman was at home
without medical care).
77. Mark A. Hall et al., Judicial Protectionof Managed Care Consumers: An Empirical
Study of InsuranceCoverage Disputes, 26 Seton Hall L. Rev. 1055, 1068 (1996) (noting that
patients often "find it too expensive or too difficult to pursue their objections through the
costly and time-consuming judicial process").
78. Health plans "are largely free to try to shape physicians' clinical behavior by
profiling their practice patterns, linking plan participation and referrals to economic
performance, and offering financial rewards for clinical frugality." M. Gregg Bloche, One
Step Ahead of the Law: Market Pressures and the Evolution of Managed Care, in The
Privatization of Health Care Reform: Legal and Regulatory Perspectives, supra note 7, at 22,
25; see also Havighurst, supra note 7, at 13 (noting that "[h]ealth plans routinely select their
subcontractors based on low cost, not demonstrated skill in treating patients, and compensate
them in ways that can induce neglect or undertreatment"); David Orentlicher, Paying
Physicians More to Do Less: FinancialIncentives to Limit Care, 30 U. Rich. L. Rev. 155,
156 (1996) (describing the types of financial incentives to limit care, but then concluding
that complete "opposition to financial incentives is ultimately misguided, [because] it gives
insufficient weight to the benefits of financial incentives and to the broader context in which
financial incentives are used" and recommending that "the government should place limits
on the extent to which financial incentives can be used, [but] not prohibit the incentives
entirely").
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benefit of saving the insurer money and shifting the apparent blame to the
treating physician, rather than the insurance company. This is analogous to
an adverse utilization review as discussed above. It is well documented that
"the practice style of physicians is influenced by the explicit and implicit
financial incentives under which they operate. ' '79 For example, one recent
econometric study in the fee-for-service setting found that switching
physician compensation from a fixed salary to profit sharing at a set of
clinics owned by a hospital chain
resulted in physicians increasing the
80
number of patients that they saw.
Another recent econometric study in the managed care setting confirmed
that costs were reduced most when the incentives for physicians to cut costs
were the greatest. 8 1 The most common structure of this type used by
managed care organizations to incentivize physicians to cut costs is called
"capitation." In a capitation scheme, a physician receives from the payor a
fixed amount of money for agreeing to treat a particular patient for a
specified time interval. If the patient requires treatment in the specified
period worth less than the capitation payment, the physician keeps the
profit. If the patient requires treatment worth more than the capitation
payment, the physician receives no additional money from the insurance
company. The physician's incentive is to maximize the number of patients
and provide no more care than is paid for by the capitation payment. 82 In
such circumstances, a patient might not even be aware that the physician is
not providing care. The patient relies on the physician to tell her what care
is needed; one manifestation of agency risk in this setting is that the
physician simply does not mention treatment or care that is financially
unattractive to a physician operating under a capitation scheme.
79. David J. Cooper & James B. Rebitzer, Managed Careand PhysicianIncentives: The
Effects of Competition on the Cost and Quality of Care, 5 Contributions to Econ. Analysis &
Pol'y,
No.
I,
art.
16
(2006),
at
4,
available
at
http://www.bepress.com/bejeap/contributions/vol5/iss 1/art 16
(discussing
"recent
econometric studies" that support this proposition). Of course, the governing legal rules will
affect the ways in which payors choose to incentivize providers and, in turn, the resulting
provider behavior. See generally Kathryn Zeiler, Medical Malpractice and Contract
Disclosure:An EquilibriumModel of the Effects of Legal Rules on Behavior in Health Care
Markets (Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr., Bus., Econ. & Regulatory Policy Working Paper No.
539224, 2004), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=539224 (developing a theoretical model
of how specific legal rules affect ways in which managed care organizations decide to
compensate physicians and the effect of such rules on physician treatment decisions).
80. See Cooper & Rebitzer, supra note 79, at 4 (discussing Jason R. Barro & Nancy
Dean Beaulieu, Selection and Improvement: Physician Responses to Financial Incentives
(Harvard
NOM
Research
Paper
Series
No.
00-03,
2000),
available at
http://papers.ssm.com/paper.tafabstract?id=258560).
81. See id. (discussing Martin Gaynor, James B. Rebitzer & Lowell J. Taylor, Physician
Incentives in Health Maintenance Organizations,112 J. Pol. Econ. 915 (2004)).
82. T. Gosden et al., Capitation, Salary, Fee-for-Service and Mixed Systems of Payment:
Effects on the Behaviour of Primary Care Physicians, at summary (2000),
http://www.cochrane.org/reviews/en/ab002215.html (finding that "[t]here is some evidence
to suggest that the method of payment of primary care physicians affects their behaviour"
but noting that "[miore evaluations of the effect of payment systems on PCP behaviour are
needed, especially in terms of the relative impact of salary versus capitation payments").
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Of course, payors may engage in additional practices to incentivize
providers to cut costs. Some practices are formalized (e.g., providers may
be penalized financially for specialist referrals or hospitalizations above
8
preset limits or financially rewarded for coming in under such limits).

3

Other practices are more indirect. Much scholarship has been devoted to
the significance of these incentives as well as proposed ways in which to
address problems that result.8 4

IV. DEVELOPING A TAXONOMY OF REFORM OBJECTIVES
Numerous proposals to "fix" health care have been promoted by scholars,
advocates, and legislators alike. In our view, any reform proposal must
address EACPs, or numerous problems afflicting the current system will
continue, and perhaps worsen. We argue below that any attempt to address
agency risk necessarily falls into one of the following three broad
categories: (1) proposals to improve the welfare plan bargaining process,
(2) proposals to improve the terms of the bargain, and (3) proposals to make
the fiduciary live up to the bargain. We categorize reform suggestions in
this way because we believe these labels capture the objective of the
reforms contained in the category. This grouping should facilitate the
establishment of an empirical research agenda that can address the difficult
questions whose answers must inform any considered attempt at systemic
reform.
A. Toward an Open Bargain
ERISA does not require employers to offer welfare plans. Thus, existing
welfare plans can be viewed as voluntary deals between the fiduciary and
the plan participants. One could argue that the current system needs no
change because it reflects a fair bargain struck between participants and
fiduciaries-a bargain where the cost of agency risk is minimal8 5 and
willingly borne by the participant as part of the deal in return for lower
83. In the 1990s, there was a public outcry when some insurers went so far as to insert
gag clauses in their contract with physicians. Gag clauses prevent the physician from
disclosing to the patient more expensive alternative treatments for certain conditions. For a
discussion of such clauses, see Bethany J. Spielman, After the Gag Episode: Physician

Communication in Managed Care Organizations, 22 Seton Hall Legis. J. 437, 467 (1998),
and Nancy J. Picinic, Note, Physicians, Bound & Gagged: Federal Attempts to Combat

Managed Care's Use of Gag Clauses, 21 Seton Hall Legis. J. 567 (1997).
84. See Cooper & Rebitzer, supra note 79 (arguing that increased competition between
HMOs can mitigate the adverse effects of physician incentives); see also Mark A. Hall, A
Theory of Economic Informed Consent, 31 Ga. L. Rev. 511, 518-21 (1997) (arguing for

"global disclosure" of a cost-containment mechanism at the time of enrollment); Elizabeth
A. McGlynn et al., The Quality of Health Care Delivered to Adults in the United States, 348
New Eng. J. Med. 2635, 2635 (2003) (discussing the fact that deficits "in adherence to
recommended processes for basic care pose serious threats to the health of the American
public"); Deven C. McGraw, FinancialIncentives to Limit Services: Should Physicians Be
Required to Disclose These to Patients?, 83 Geo. L.J. 1821, 1838-39 (1995).

85. The argument is that the cost is minimal because opportunistic behavior against one
principal could severely damage the agent's reputation with other prospective principals.
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premiums or other consideration. But that argument presumes, among
other things, that the bargaining process is fair. 86 Many reform proposals
reject that notion and rest on the predicate belief that the current welfare
plan bargaining process can be improved.
Scholarship and reforms targeted at the bargaining process often focus on
disclosure, specifically more disclosure about the terms of the plan and the
incentives underlying the provision of benefits. 87 The belief is that current
plans are structured and operated as they are-namely, with a high
likelihood of agency risk-because participants are uninformed about the
substantive and operative specifics of the plan, particularly the incentives
faced by fiduciaries and their designees. 88 The theory is that, once
participants are armed with more accurate information about the plans (and
thus the true likely cost of agency risk), they can bargain fairly and will
demand lower premiums or other changes to the plan that favor
beneficiaries. 89
Unsurprisingly, one popular disclosure idea is that health plans must
reveal to their participants or prospective participants the terms of their
contracts with physicians. Thus, to the extent that a health plan payor uses
physician contracts that have gag clauses, capitation arrangements, or other
incentives for physicians to choose treatments that maximize profits at the
possible expense of quality of care, participants can bargain (collectively)
over the negative worth or acceptability of those plan features.
Disclosure solutions are not perfect. First, it is not clear that further
disclosure or efforts to educate will be read or understood by plan
participants. Unless read and understood, additional information will have
little, if any, effect on the health care bargain struck. Second, even if
further disclosure does, in fact, provide comprehensible information for the
employee-participant, plans are largely contracts of adhesion. Better
86. The view also presumes that all that matters is whether the bargaining process that
resulted in the deal was fair and that outcomes are irrelevant. We do not opine on what, if
any, principles of social justice should trump socially undesirable results that arise from a
fair bargaining process.
87. See, e.g., Kathryn Zeiler, Turningfrom Damage Caps to Information Disclosure:An

Alternative to Tort Reform, 5 Yale J. Health Pol'y, L. & Ethics 385 (2005) (encouraging
policy makers to consider mandating disclosure of the contract terms between managed care
organizations and physicians for the provision of services); Zeiler, supra note 79 (predicting
that mandating the disclosure of contract terms between managed care organizations and
physicians for the provision of services will result in higher rates of treatment and lower
rates of lawsuits).
88. See, e.g., Kristin Madison, Regulating Health Care Quality in an Information Age,
40 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1577, 1584 (2007) ("In short, absent regulation, information failures
may hinder patients' access to the quality of care they would otherwise demand and
receive.").
89. See McGraw, supra note 84, at 1824 (noting that "widespread use of [financial
incentives] represents a sharp departure from the traditional notions of the physician as
fiduciary to the patient" and proposing disclosure). See generally Mark A. Hall, The Theory
and Practice of Disclosing HMO Physician Incentives, 65 Law & Contemp. Probs. 207
(2002). Alternatively, to the extent the participants are more informed and the plans stay the
same, one could argue that nothing more needs to be done.
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information need be actionable for it to change outcomes. To the extent
that a plan is being provided by a third party, actual bargaining power
regarding plan specifics resides with the employer, who, although no doubt
subject to employee pressures (particularly so if the employees are
unionized), nonetheless has divergent interests from the employees. Thus,
any bargaining power the employees have is indirect and funneled through
the employer, subject to agency risk on the part of the employer. 90 In the
final analysis, the benefits to any particular disclosure rules will necessarily
turn on complex empirical analysis.
B. Toward a DesirableBargain
A second avenue of reform focuses on improving the terms of the
bargain for participants. This type of reform is attractive to observers who
believe bargaining problems can never be fully fixed, 9 1 as well as those
who believe that even if bargaining were perfectly fair, it might result in
socially undesirable outcomes, with desirable outcomes more important
92
than a fair process.
1. Mandatory Entitlements or Prohibitions
Government-imposed entitlements and prohibitions reflect the legislative
93
judgment that all socially desirable health bargains need certain terms.
90. Plans offered directly by employers and negotiated by union representatives face a
smaller bargaining agency risk (as the union's interests are more closely aligned with the
employee's interests than the employer's interests are), and thus present situations in which
further disclosure is more likely to benefit the employees. Plans offered directly by
employers in nonunionized industries, even with substantive disclosures about plan terms,
pose serious bargaining problems because it is too costly for any one employee to invest the
time to assess the merits of the proposed plan and then force the employer to negotiate,
either on an individual basis or with all employees.
91. See generally Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis
of Imperfect Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. Pa. L. Rev. 630, 633-34
(1979).
92. See generally Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, Debiasing Through Law, 35 J.
Legal Stud. 199, 207 (2006) (observing that both heightened standards for product liability
and bans on dangerous products are used to protect consumers who underestimate risk).
93. Certainly government-imposed rules that target agency risk can effectively reduce it
because of the penalty (be it statutory or common law) that attaches to noncompliance with
the risk-reducing rule, as we discuss below. But government rules also can have a deterrent
effect on agency risk separate and apart from the financial deterrent associated with
government penalties. Because of the more negative reputational consequences of breaking
clear rules, the more comprehensive the list of entitlements and prohibitions, and the more
clear the triggering conditions to the same are, the less likely it is that a fiduciary will engage
in opportunistic behavior (either in manipulation of benefits or in prohibited conduct),
whatever the government-imposed penalty for noncompliance. In addition to the fact that
self-serving rule-breaking behavior has more significant reputational costs than self-serving
interpretative behavior (as explained above), self-serving behavior that flouts government
(rather than contract) rules bears additional risk for the agent. Specifically, the breaking of
government rules is more likely to attract retributive government attention in the form of (1)
legislative action to unfavorably change the damage rules (either increasing criminal or civil
penalties) or (2) legislative action to change the substance or operation of liability rules
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Mandatory entitlements reflect the government's determination that all
bargains need include some minimum terms relating to specific medical
care to which participants are entitled. 94 For example, in 1996 the federal
government significantly curtailed the ability of group health insurers to
impose preexisting condition exclusion. 95 This reflected the legislative
view that it was simply unfair to exclude those with preexisting conditions
from obtaining the tax and group advantages of participating in tax-favored
employer health plans. 96 That same year, Congress also required that group
plans cover minimum postpartum hospital stays for a mother and/or her
newborn (forty-eight hours for vaginal delivery, ninety-six hours for
Caesarean section). 97 This was a legislative response to insurers' attempt to
98
economize by limiting postpartum hospital stays to a day or less.
Congress simply believed that limiting coverage to hospital stays below a
(moving to strict liability, legislating a stricter form of judicial review, etc.). On the flip
side, the less clear the government entitlement or prohibition, the less effective it will be in
reputationally deterring agents from finding a way to behave strategically. The problem with
using entitlements and prohibitions to deter agency risk (absent strong imposed penalties) is
that establishing clear rules and triggering conditions for the mandated entitlement or
prohibition benefits is difficult in the health care setting. Because medicine is more art than
science and humans possess bounded rationality, neither the entire universe of future
conditions nor the required response can be spelled out ex ante without relying on some level
of circumstantial discretion. Were that not the case-were future conditions and the
corresponding agent action subject to rigid description (such as, in the finance setting,
proscribing courses of action for the agent depending on the price of a particular financial
instrument)-then participants could without government intervention insert such clear rules
in a contract. But few contracts have done so, even in cases where bargaining power is
closer to equal. An ex ante entitlement or prohibition is limited in the extent to which it
alone can reduce agency risk.
94. As applied to health care, see Russell B. Korobkin, The Efficiency ofManaged Care
"Patient Protection" Laws: Incomplete Contracts, Bounded Rationality, and Market
Failure,85 Cornell L. Rev. 1, 4, 9 (1999) (observing that "the legal academy has engaged in
no real debate over the general efficacy of what is alternatively known as 'patient-protection'
or 'mandated-benefits' legislation" and arguing that "government mandates are a useful tool
in the arsenals of lawmakers who are concerned with ensuring that our society devotes the
efficient level of resources to health care"). See generally Russell B. Korobkin, Bounded
Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1203
(2003) (arguing that consumers only consider a limited number of product attributes when
making a purchasing decision and that the proper policy response to the inefficiency that
results from this phenomenon is the greater use of mandatory contract terms). Mandating
contract terms, of course, also addresses perceived unequal bargaining power. If certain
parts of any deal are required by law, then unequal bargaining power can only accomplish
victories for the more powerful party in areas for which the law has no protective
requirement.
95. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191,
§ 701(l)-(3), 110 Stat. 1936, 1939-40 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 and
42 U.S.C.).
96. See generally 142 Cong. Rec. H9785 (1996).
97. Newborns' and Mothers' Health Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-204,
§ 71 l(a)(1), 110 Stat. 2935, 2936 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 and 42
U.S.C.).
98. See, e.g., Eugene Declercq & Diana Simmes, The Politics of "Drive-Through
Deliveries": Putting Early PostpartumDischarge on the Legislative Agenda, 75 Milbank Q.
175, 190-91 (1997).
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certain minimum was unfair.9 9 Mandatory entitlements target agency risk
because they prevent fiduciaries from exploiting bargaining power to
exclude explicitly attractive and basic plan terms (i.e., no coverage for
preexisting conditions) and from interpreting a plan's terms not to include a
reasonable construction of a covered benefit (i.e., where the plan covers
pregnancy but interprets coverage to extend to only an unreasonably short
postpartum stay).
Public (and judicial) complaints about undesirable fiduciary behavior
also have led observers to propose reform measures targeting specific selfserving acts. Two examples of such regulation are antigag rules and
antiretaliation requirements.10 0 Participant-patients are not medical experts,
and they rely upon their physicians to give them accurate medical advice
regarding all treatment options. Participants expect and are entitled to
clinical candor from their physicians. To the extent a fiduciary unduly
limits a physician's ability to be candid and complete in rendering medical
advice-either by a gag provision or threat of firing-that is a clear case of
the fiduciary prioritizing its zero-sum interest ahead of the patient's. Such
prohibitions against specific self-interested conduct squarely target agency
risk.' 0 ' The problem is that these prohibitions only deter the specific
proscribed conduct. For example, fiduciaries need not resort to a crude gag
provision to exert a coercive influence on a physician's candor; informal
organizational pressure or the occasional withholding of discretionary
performance bonuses from an uncooperative physician can do the trick.
Antigag and antiretaliation rules do not deter whispered coercion.
2. Modifying Liability Standards
A different tack from focusing on specific acts the fiduciary must or must
not perform is to adjust the rule used to determine in general when a
fiduciary's conduct is blameworthy, namely, to adjust the liability standard
applicable to the fiduciary. Perhaps the most popular proposal-both in
terms of scholarly ink spilled and practitioners arguing it ad hoc before trial
judges-is to hold the fiduciary vicariously liable for any malpractice
committed by the physician. Vicarious liability is the notion that, when one
party hires or controls another, the dominant party is liable for the
controlled party's torts, even if there is no negligence on the part of the
dominant party. Vicarious liability targets EACPs because it gives the
fiduciary an incentive to influence the physician in a way that reduces the
likelihood of negligent treatment. At a minimum, vicarious liability
reduces the zero-sum agency risk posed to participants because it
99. See id.
100. Antigag rules prohibit fiduciaries from contractually requiring treating physicians
not to mention alternative treatments that are more expensive or otherwise disfavored by the
plan. Antiretaliation rules prohibit fiduciaries from firing without cause physicians who
exercise their medical judgment in ways contrary to the plan's interest.
101. Like mandatory benefits, prohibitions of specific conduct can supply a reputational
deterrent (apart from any government-imposed penalties) if the prohibition is clear enough.
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discourages the fiduciary from actively incentivizing the physician to take
risks with the standard of care so as to decrease the amount of benefits paid
out.
Any monetary savings attributable to reduced benefits are
counterweighed by an increase in liability exposure, to the extent any
reduced provision of benefits increases the risk of a successful malpractice
02
claim.'
C. Toward an EnforceableBargain
The last group of reform proposals focuses on mechanisms to ensure that
the fiduciary lives up to the terms of the bargain. These proposals fall into
three subcategories: (1) subjecting the fiduciary's behavior to review, (2)
changing the standard of review, and (3) increasing the penalties associated
with improper behavior.
1. Subjecting the Fiduciary to Impartial Review
To the extent that the fiduciary is answerable to an external third party
who either can require the fiduciary to take a certain action or impose a
financial penalty on the fiduciary, external review is a potential mechanism
for policing self-interested behavior on the part of the fiduciary. External
review significantly diminishes agency risk because the agent's discretion
for opportunistic behavior is circumscribed by the determinations of an
impartial reviewer.
Litigation, of course, is nothing more than a very expensive, very timeconsuming type of external review. But most proposed reforms involving
litigation address the standard of review and the remedies available to
litigants, not the character of the external review, should it occur. In
contrast, one popular reform proposal (enacted in many states) recognizes
the benefits of external review and proposes a particular character: namely
impartial, third-party administrative review. 10 3 Administrative review is
attractive because, to the extent it is timely and inexpensive, it need have
less stringent penalties to deter strategic behavior. In other words, if a
fiduciary knows a benefit denial will be reviewed by an impartial actor
quickly and cheaply, there is little for the fiduciary to gain by wrongfully
denying the benefit, even if the cost of a loss before the third-party
administrator is merely the cost of the benefit. Conversely, administrative
102. For example, some observers have argued that prospective utilization review
materially reduces a physician's incentives to acquire relevant expertise and thus increases
the risk that the physician will provide negligent care. See generally Jennifer Arlen & W.
Bentley MacLeod, Torts, Expertise, & Authority: Liability of Physiciansand Managed Care
Organizations, 36 RAND J. Econ. 494 (2005) (arguing that managed care organizations
(MCOs) should be held liable for physician torts because the MCOs' use of utilization
review materially reduces physicians' incentives to acquire relevant expertise).
103. See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 20-2537 (2002); Fla. Stat. § 408.7056 (2002); N.Y.
Ins. Law §§ 4910, 4914 (McKinney 2007). For a discussion of external review, see Leatrice
Berman-Sandler, Independent Medical Review: Expanding Legal Remedies to Achieve
Managed CareAccountability, 13 Annals Health L. 233 (2004).
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review's effectiveness may be limited if access to external review were
expensive or time-consuming. In that case, the fiduciary has reason to
engage in strategic behavior because it hopes such behavior will be too
10 4
costly for participants to challenge.
One way to lessen the effectiveness of administrative review in
combating opportunistic agency risk is to permit fiduciaries to have
extended internal review procedures that a beneficiary must satisfy before
being eligible for external review. 10 5 Although having written internal
review procedures and guidelines decreases the agency risk that benefit
denials will be wrongfully made because the fiduciary does not wish to
expend the effort to reviewing the merits of the claim (indolent denials
being more likely the less process is in place), extended internal review as a
precondition for external review may serve as a gauntlet for ill
beneficiaries, thus decreasing the likelihood the external review process will
ever commence. In terms of agency risk, the best combination may be
optional (at the participant's choice) internal review-to discourage lazy
denials-and matter-of-right external administrative review-to discourage
strategic denials.
External review often is criticized on cost grounds, and it does increase
costs (at a minimum because both benefits payors and the external review
body have to maintain a review infrastructure), but it reduces the cost of
104. Other limits on effectiveness include (1) not having a third-party reviewer who is
genuinely impartial and (2) participants not being aware that administrative review is
available or of how they may take advantage of it. Regarding the impartiality of the thirdparty reviewer, it is difficult to imagine how impartial third-party reviewers could exist
absent government action, either through direct government action by creating external
review departments within both federal and state health agencies, or indirect action by
certifying qualified private entities seeking to supply a review function as impartial external
reviewers. However, once impartial reviewers are created and knowable, it is not necessarily
the case that external review itself be government mandated in all situations because if equal
bargaining power exists, then external review could be negotiated or traded for other
considerations. External review is an unlikely negotiating bargaining chip when there are
difficulties in finding and agreeing upon genuinely neutral third-party reviewers. But, if
impartial reviewers existed, then one can imagine scenarios where, if the self-insurer or
third-party insurer had a track record of its determinations being upheld by external review,
employees would prefer limited external review (for emergency or high-value cases) and
additional other benefits over unconditional external review.
105. In 2001, the Department of Labor issued new regulations requiring that benefit
claims and appeals be decided within a much shorter time frame if they are claims that
require preauthorization before treatment can be given. See 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1 (2007).
Some have argued that preauthorization requirements for certain nonexpensive treatments
are less prevalent in health plans as a result of this regulatory change. See, e.g., Phyllis C.
Borzi et al., Geo. Wash. Sch. of Pub. Health & Health Servs., How Care Is Managed: A
Descriptive Study of Current and Future Trends in Care and Cost Management Practices
Under Private
Sector
Employee
Benefit
Plans 9 (2002), available at
http://www.gwumc.edu/sphhs/healthpolicy/chsrp/downloads/ASPE-ful_-report.032604.pdf
("Several of the employee benefit plan consultants noted that although the majority of
employer health plans still have them, pre-authorization requirements for in-patient care and
behavioral health services were not as prevalent as they had been in the past. Many saw this
in part as a consequence of the new claims and appeals regulations issued by the U.S.
Department of Labor under [ERISA].").
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agency risk. Strictly speaking, whether external review is cost justified
hinges on how costly agency risk is to principals. In any event, even if
external review is more costly than the agency risk it eliminates, which we
doubt, the nation may be willing to incur a higher price for an outcome it
perceives as socially desirable (i.e., impartial health benefits decisions).
The primary theoretical problem with external review as a cure for
agency risk is that its effectiveness is limited to determinations an
individual knows to be wrong, and thus can affect structural plan
shortcomings caused by agency risk only indirectly. In other words,
participants cannot contest conduct they do not know occurred. Although
administrative review arguably could be used to recognize and correct
patterns of self-serving conduct that manifested themselves in ways
different from knowable, adverse benefit determinations, to expand the
scope (and magnitude) of behavior subject to administrative review would
likely make the process more costly and time-consuming-in other words,
more like litigation. In that case, the advantages of administrative review
would be lessened.
2. Changing the Standard of Review of the Fiduciary
Some scholars, working within the confines of ERISA, have proposed
that agency risk be addressed by modifying the standard an external
reviewer employs when reviewing a fiduciary's contested decision.' 0 6 The
less deferential the reviewer is to the fiduciary's preliminary determination,
the less agency risk the fiduciary poses to the participant. In contrast, with
a deferential standard of review, fiduciary determinations are less likely to
be challenged, and also less likely to be won by those who do challenge.
Unsurprisingly, ever since the Supreme Court in Firestone Tire &
Rubber Co. v. Bruch ruled that a fiduciary's granting itself discretion to
make benefits determinations would entitle it to deferential "arbitrary and
capricious" review, tempered by the degree to which conflict of interest was
present in the given case, 107 virtually every plan contains a grant of such
discretion. Other scholars, notably Professor John Langbein, have assailed
the Court's ruling that an ERISA fiduciary's discretion deserves deference
given the inherent conflict created by ERISA's decision to permit
fiduciaries to be plan administrators. 108 Lower courts have struggled to
categorize the precise level of conflict present under different fumding
arrangements and then to apply the appropriate standard of review to each
106. See generally Nan D. Hunter, Managed Process, Due Care: Structures of
Accountability in Health Care (Brooklyn Law Sch. Legal Studies Working Paper Series No.
27, 2004), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cftn?abstractid=630482.
Generally this discussion relates to a court's standard of review, but it could just as easily
govern the appropriate standard of review an administrative reviewer should take.
107. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 498 U.S. 101, 115 (1989).
108. See generally John H. Langbein, Trust Law as Regulatory Law: The
Unum/Provident Scandal and JudicialReview of Benefit Denials Under ERISA, 101 Nw. U.
L. Rev. 1315 (2007).
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level of conflict, with the review becoming less deferential as the conflict
becomes more serious. 10 9 In our view, such is splitting the hair too thin.
Zero-sum agency risk affects all plan funding arrangements, and the
difference between the threat posed by alternative funding arrangements
seems less than the difference between a conflicted fiduciary and an
impartial one. Under that line of reasoning, the standard should mirror the
"conflicted agent" standard from other areas of law: the agent should have
to prove that its action was inherently fair.
3. Adjusting the Penalties for Improper Behavior
Perhaps the most contentious proposals involve increasing the penalties
for improper fiduciary behavior. Increased penalties address agency risk
because they force self-serving fiduciaries to internalize the costs of their
conduct if liability is established. ERISA, as it stands, does not permit
punitive or traditional consequential damages in connection with a denial of
benefits. Supplying a more complete remedy to injured participants-as
many have proposed-would directly address EACPs. We here briefly
discuss the considerable influence the availability of traditional civil
damages would have on conflicted fiduciaries." 10
Even were conflicted agency risk entirely absent from the equation,
traditional damages would deter careless health care denials, a considerable
benefit. Of course, wrongful denials are tempting because such denials, in
some instances, may permit a conflicted fiduciary to capture the time value
of money against only the slim cost of paying attorneys' fees if the denial is
successfully contested. 111 In any event, the chance that an ill beneficiary
may lack the resources or will to contest a denial-in which case a denial is
pure profit-makes denials a financially attractive risk indeed. If the
financial stakes are high enough, a fiduciary might be motivated to
systematically deny benefits, as evidenced by the Unum/Provident
debacle. 112 Such conduct seems a perfect fit for punitive damages. In the
health care context, benefit denials can have a very high nonfinancial cost.
Many participants cannot independently pay for treatment, so a denial of
coverage equals a deprivation of treatment, which may result in serious
109. See Donald T. Bogan & Benjamin Fu, ERISA: No Further Inquiry into Conflicted
Plan Administrator Claim Denials, 58 Okla. L. Rev. 637, 652 n.71 (2005) (discussing
standards of review across circuits).
110. Although certainly increasing fines that the secretary of labor could impose for
ERISA violations would increase the deterrent effect, the value of such a deterrent would
vary widely depending on whether the secretary was assertive. In contrast, the history of
American law shows that private civil remedies are always pressed with vigor by private
attorneys, particularly those compensated on a contingent basis. We thus confine our
discussion here to the proposed expansion of private civil remedies.
111. See Flint v. ABB, Inc., 337 F.3d 1326 (1 lth Cir. 2003) (holding that accrued interest
is not recoverable for benefit denial). But see Dobson v. Hartford Fin. Servs. Group, Inc.,
389 F.3d 386 (2d Cir. 2004) (concluding that accrued interest may be recoverable and
ordering remand).
112. See Langbein, supra note 108, at 1317-21.
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injury or death for the participant. There are nonfinancial reasons to err on
the side of deterrence. Of course, the decision to authorize any particular
remedy must be driven by some measure of empirical data. 1 13
V. CONCLUSION:

EACPs AND THE FUTURE OF HEALTH CARE

At the broadest level, there are only two ways to address EACPs: require
administration by an impartial trustee or impose safeguards that protect
against biased conduct. The framing questions, then, are as follows: Do the
dominant proposals in the two major health care movements address
EACPs? If so, do they confront EACPs by creating an impartial trustee, by
creating effective safeguards, or some combination of the two? Proposals
that do not admit of ready answers to these questions necessarily promise
more than they will deliver.
A. The Defined ContributionMovement
Let us return briefly to the pension setting. Recall that there are two
types of pension plans: defined benefit and defined contribution. 14 The
emerging consensus among both scholars and policy makers is that there
has been a generational move away from the traditional defined benefit
pension plans and toward defined contribution plans as the dominant mode
of delivering pension benefits." 5 Some herald this transition as indicative
of Americans' preference for an "ownership society" in which individuals
have practical "ownership" and control of their retirement benefits and can
invest according to their risk and consumption preferences, instead of
relying on a paternalistic employer to supply them with a fixed benefit that
is not tailored to their individual preferences. Whatever the truth of the
claim that Americans prefer defined contribution to defined benefit
retirement plans, or whether the transition from the latter to the former
evidences some broad philosophical preference for "ownership," there is
reason to believe that we are experiencing a movement toward defined
contribution in the world of health care benefits. 116
113. Zeiler, supra note 87, at 388 (noting that "neither proponents nor opponents of
[damage] caps have considered how caps might affect treatment choices made by physicians
and managed care organizations").
114. See supra note 14-15.
115. See, e.g., Edward A. Zelinsky, The Defined Contribution Paradigm, 114 Yale L.J.
451 (2004).

116. President George W. Bush is one vocal supporter of this movement. See, e.g., White
House,
Affordable,
Accessible,
and
Flexible
Health
Coverage,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/stateoftheunion/2007/initiatives/healthcare.html
(last visited
Mar. 8, 2008); see also Borzi et al., supra note 105, at 14 ("According to the experts, many
employers are considering offering their employees a restructured health plan that
establishes overall limits on the employer's promise to finance health care for its employees.
These plans [are] often called 'consumer-driven' or 'defined contribution' health
plans .. "); id. at 17 ("[M]ost employers seem to be looking to two principal mechanisms
to manage their costs:... [including] moving away from more traditional models of
employer-sponsored health plan coverage in favor of various defined contribution
approaches.").
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Defined contribution health care proposals rely in large part on the use of
tax-deductible individual health savings accounts (analogous to a 401(k)
account or individual retirement account in the pension setting) and highdeductible health insurance. 117 Participants use the money in their
individual accounts to pay for minor, "everyday" medical costs; the health
insurance kicks in for unexpectedly large expenditures. Costs incurred that
exceed the balance of the health savings account but fall short of the
deductible are paid for out-of-pocket by the individual. The purported
benefits to such hybrid plans are twofold: first, they permit individuals to
implement their preferred preferences between health savings and other
uses of income; and, second, they avoid the claimed overconsumption
hazard associated with insurance policies that require only nominal out-ofpocket expenditures for additional care.1 18 Because people will be
spending their own money for each use of medical services, the economic
temptation to overconsume care will be largely squelched.
Many scholars and policy makers already have begun to debate the
advantages and disadvantages of a move toward defined contribution
employee benefit plans."l 9 Regardless of the merits or flaws of defined
117. For tax purposes, "high deductible" is defined as a minimum annual deductible of
$1000 or more for unmarried individuals and $2000 for a family, and a maximum annual
deductible of $5000 and $10,000 respectively. I.R.C. § 223(c)(2) (Supp. IV 2004). These
limits are tied to inflation. Id. § 223(g).
118. When a patient has insurance, many commentators have pointed out that there exists
an economic incentive for overconsumption of care, i.e., the moral hazard of
overconsumption. The patient does not pay the bill for care; she merely receives the benefit.
Thus, the argument goes, it makes economic sense for her to demand care without regard to
cost, with the result being that she will demand much more care than she would if she were
paying the cost of additional care herself.
We believe the magnitude of this risk is overstated. Obtaining care--even care paid for
by another-is not costless to the patient. One must miss work or sacrifice leisure time to
receive diagnosis and treatment, and many treatments have short-term negative physical
utility. That is, neither medical procedures (nor even simple medication) are free of pain or
without side effects. This is why many people opt for physical therapy-which is
considerably cheaper than surgery-to address back problems before trying surgery, even if
insurance pays for both.
Moreover, much care is not discretionary and thus far less susceptible to moral hazard. A
diabetic does not consume insulin because someone else is paying for it. In contrast, the
agency risk we have identified infects all benefit decisions made by a conflicted agent,
whether the subject care is discretionary or nondiscretionary. Indeed, ERISA-by investing
a fiduciary with the discretion to make benefit decisions and insulating it from liability for
improper conduct-creates a pervasiveness and degree of agency risk tolerated in no other
field of American law.
119. See, e.g., Amy B. Monahan, The Promise and Peril of Ownership Society Health
Care Policy, 80 Tul. L. Rev. 777 (2006); E. Haavi Morreim, High-DeductibleHealth Plans:
New Twists on Old Challenges from Tort and Contract, 59 Vand. L. Rev. 1207 (2006)
(analyzing three kinds of litigation that are likely to arise when patients pay for their own
care); see also Borzi et al., supra note 105, at 20 ("Some of the experts we interviewed
observed that defined contribution health plans were primarily a means to shift costs to
employees. These experts do not believe they serve as care management tools. They
expressed concern that, as currently structured, defined contribution products put employees
and their families at risk for a greater share of medical expenses without giving them the
tools necessary to make better health care choices."); Milt Freudenheim, A New Health Plan
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contribution health plans, however, one fact is inescapable: their adoption
will do little, if anything, to counter the threat of EACPs. To the extent that
individuals will control a portion of their health expenditures, EACPs are
admittedly small. But no credible advocate of these plans has suggested
that individual health accounts entirely displace traditional insurance. That
is because insurance supplies a risk-sharing function that individual
accounts cannot. Few individuals can or would save enough to pay for
catastrophic medical needs, like cancer treatment or organ transplants; only
insurance is fit to provide security against those eventualities. Thus,
proponents of hybrid plans envision a world where individuals will (in a
subsidized way) assume the expense of low-cost, routine medical care,
while the insurer will bear the expense of high-cost, nondiscretionary care
beyond the power of even the most pessimistic individual account holder.
A hybrid plan positively may impact moral hazard and EACPs for lowcost medical treatments (particularly discretionary treatments). But it
generates no constrictive force at all vis-A-vis the EACPs that menace the
provision of benefits associated with major medical expenses that exceed
the deductible. Unless such insurance is administered by a nonconflicted
decision maker or with more safeguards than ERISA currently provides,
EACPs will be no less likely to flourish than as under the current system
and those disputes that result from EACPs will involve the particular issues
that are of the highest stakes to the beneficiary. 120 No public predictions
exist for the dollar volume of the sought care that would be above any
particular deductible level-and thus subject to EACPs-but there is good
reason to expect that a significant majority of the benefits conferred would
be through the insurance component, not through expenditures from
individual health savings accounts. 12 1 In our view, any sober discussion of
the defined contribution movement need recognize and address that reality.
B. The Universal Coverage Movement
Estimates peg America's uninsured at forty-seven million. 122 That an
enormous number of people in America lack any health insurance has not
May Raise Expenses for Sickest Workers, N.Y. Times, Dec. 5, 2001, at Al; Cato Inst., The

Ownership

Society

and

Health

Care,

http://www.cato.org/special/ownership-society/healthcare.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2008).
120. Indeed, one would guess that the type of care participants would most desire to
insulate from EACPs would be life-saving or life-extending care. Such treatments are the
most likely to be costly and would remain subject to EACPs under the hybrid approach.
121. This is true because the lion's share of medical spending in this country is for "big
ticket items." Thomas Rice, The Economics of Health Reconsidered 82, 95-96 (1998).
More than forty percent of health care expenditures each year are incurred by two percent of
the U.S. population. Id.; see also Karen Davis, Consumer-Directed Health Care: Will It
Improve Health System Performance?, 39 Health Services Res. 1219, 1223 (noting that ten

percent of individuals account for sixty-nine percent of health care costs).
122. Nat'l
Coalition
on
Health
Care,
Health
Insurance
Coverage,
http://www.nchc.org/facts/coverage.shtml (last visited Feb. 11, 2008).
Although some

uninsured persons no doubt choose not to purchase insurance, the vast majority of the
uninsured simply do not have access to affordable health insurance.
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escaped the attention of reformers. Indeed, for many, this is the central flaw
with the health care system in America, and a prescription for vastly
reducing the number of uninsured (thus attaining universal or near universal
coverage) is the cornerstone of many reform proposals.1 2 3 Although such
proposals vary considerably in form, any universal coverage proposal that
124 is entirely free of EACPs. 12 5
does away with employer-based insurance
The converse is equally true: to the extent that a proposed reform retains
employer-based insurance (and does not modify ERISA or create new
federal law), EACPs will remain.
Proposals containing an employer-based coverage component come in
two varieties: those that require Americans to purchase insurance offered by
an employer, or those that give Americans the option of purchasing
employer insurance or an alternative. While the first variety will hopefully
have the merit of extending coverage to the employed uninsured, such
proposals will also have the necessary demerit of continuing to subject
millions of working Americans to EACPs. The second category of
universal care proposals permits employed Americans to choose between
employer-sponsored or government-sponsored insurance. One may wonder
why, currently, Americans cannot simply choose nonemployer insurance,
and the reason is twofold: the tax and group advantages of employer plans
are significant.' 26 The individual market for insurance is not equivalently
tax favored and, laboring under adverse selection, does not offer rates or
benefit packages comparable to those of group plans. Any plan for
universal coverage that does not create a nonemployer insurance alternative
that has the same tax and group advantages as an employer plan127will leave
employed Americans with no more choice than they have today.
Choice is important for many reasons, but it is particularly important
once EACPs are taken into account. If universal coverage reform creates a
world in which employed individuals have a true, tax-indifferent choice
between an employer-based ERISA plan and a non-ERISA group plan,
transparent EACPs are far less problematic. Participants unhappy with the
level of EACPs in an employer plan simply can switch to a non-ERISA
123. Several prominent Democratic Party candidates profess either explicit membership
or great interest in this movement. See supra note 3.
124. By employer-based coverage we mean coverage where the employer either is or

financially controls the fiduciary.
125. Such plans may have non-EACPs. For example, a plan that relies upon subsidized
private insurance supplied other than by an employer would have agency risk if the insurer
doubled as the administrator, but such risk would be addressable by traditional tort law and
state regulation. Other nonemployer systems may be almost entirely free of agency risksingle-payor plans, in which the government administers benefits through a central system
and funds the program with general revenues and employer contributions, would
theoretically be a system with an impartial trustee and thus have minimal agency risk.
126. Taxpayers, in essence, are subsidizing the plans-ERISA plans-that are most
infected with agency risk.
127. One way to do this would be to eliminate the current tax exclusion. Another way
would be to keep the tax exclusion, but permit it to apply for employer and employee
contributions to nonemployer-based insurance.
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plan, i.e., a plan that has impartial fiduciaries, adequate safeguards against
agency risk, or both. Americans today employed in the private sector have
no such option.
C. EACP-Fueled Observations
Defined contribution proposals, as currently constituted, leave
unaddressed EACPs whenever health care benefits exceed the patient's
insurance deductible. As such, it is difficult to see how such plans could
ever address these agency cost problems. In contrast, universal coverage
proposals can address EACPs-by either doing away entirely with
employer-based plans, or by providing employed Americans with taxindifferent access to a non-ERISA group plan. 128 The latter may be
especially appealing to those who favor choice and competition. Americans
troubled with the level of agency risk in their employer plan can leave the
plan; Americans willing to tolerate EACPs in their employer plan will be
better positioned to bargain for lower premiums or more attractive benefits
packages. Americans, in essence, will have more control over the degree of
agency risk they are willing to live with and the exact price they are willing
to pay for it. Who would not want that?

128. Whether that access is accomplished by opening enrollment to the Federal Employee
Health Benefit Program (as Hillary Clinton has suggested, Hillary for President, American
Health Choices Plan: Quality, Affordable Health Care for Every American 1 (n.d), available
at http://www.hillaryclinton.com/feature/healthcareplan/americanhealthchoicesplan.pdf), by
creating regional insurance pools that will offer private group plans, or by expanding
existing public programs will have important policy consequences unrelated to EACPs. The
answer to such policy questions requires the weighing of empirical evidence and the making
of politically informed policy choices that are beyond the intended scope of this Article.

